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Introduction
In this paper the proposal for indirect convertibility (henceforth, IC)] put
forward by Greenfield and Yeager (1983, 1989) is reexamined and reinterpreted
to show that IC can provide a practical monetary policy rule for central banks
currently engaged in inflation targeting.  One reason for such a reexamination is
the renewal of interest in monetary policy rules, as represented by the recent
outpouring of econometric work on (implicit) policy rules [Taylor (1993),
McCallum (1999), Poole (1999), and Williams (1999)].   Although the policy rules
econometric work has not focused specifically on inflation targeting, further
econometric work on monetary rules would benefit from a deeper understanding
of the theoretical issues involved and the additional dimension that IC can bring
to that analysis.  In addition, inflation targeting in its own right continues to
command much policy support and IC both promotes that and offers a monetary
policy rule of its own.
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2Nevertheless, the monetary rule for inflation targeting that can be
extracted from IC may appear neither original nor unique.  A similar rule might be
suggested from the current econometric approach of discovering the “best”
operating rule.  Hence the contribution of IC lies not in the originality of its rule
but on its ability to clarify the nature of the “optimal” rule derived by econometric
means. IC does so by offering an analytical framework that can encompass the
econometric work on the monetary rules relevant for inflation targeting.  Without
such a framework, a rule for inflation targeting, formulated solely on
econometrics, runs the risk of missing the insights and implications of a rule
derived from the IC approach.  Furthermore, an IC framework helps relate the
econometrics of monetary policy rules to the practice of inflation targeting, since
current econometric work deals with a wider range of rules than those restricted
to inflation targeting.
Thus it is our intent in this paper to show how IC, broadly interpreted,
yields a monetary policy rule suitable for use by inflation-targeting central banks.
In demonstrating this, much of the paper will be devoted to an explanation and
analysis of IC.  To this end, the first substantive section of the paper will show
that IC differs from inflation targeting by relying explicitly on a rule rather than on
discretion to pursue similar price objectives.  This rule is developed formally in
the second section of the paper.  The third section develops the important point
that the IC rule works only through the monetary effects it induces. This opens
the way in the fourth section for a discussion of how the IC rule, developed in the
context of free banking, could be reapplied for a central bank purpose. The
3concluding section shows how an inflation-targeting central bank could operate
under a generalized IC rule and what that practice would entail relative to to-
day’s inflation-targeting activities.
I.  IC Compared With Inflation Targeting
For purposes of comparing IC with IT, IC can be interpreted as a proposal for tying the
value of the monetary unit2 to a comprehensive basket of goods and services that does not trade
directly against any representatives of the monetary unit (Greenfield and Yeager, 1989). Although
not stated explicitly, the aim is to fix the basket price of the monetary unit, usually at 1 basket per
monetary unit. This can be taken as a price target for IC. To make this fully disclosed price target
effective, the institutions involved must also commit, and be accountable for, the action necessary
to achieve the target. This can be taken to be a target rule to be followed under IC.3
In addition to imposing a target rule, IC also spells out precisely what must be done, in
terms of timing and degree of action. In other words, the proposal also imposes a very specific
operational rule, in addition to the target rule, on those taking up the proposal.
In apparent contrast with IC, IT adopts an explicit inflation rate (or price
level) target.4 This, however, is just another way of expressing a price target and
so does not represent a significant differentiation from IC. In addition, like IC the
existence of the target also calls for a public commitment to act in way consistent
                                                
2     In the original proposal for IC, the unit is defined, in non-monetary terms, as a chosen bundle
of items, with all media of exchange (such as currency and deposits) being denominated in the
bundle-defined unit. This has come to be known as monetary separation, under which nothing is
considered to fit the description of a monetary unit. Operationally, however, IC can be analyzed
without invoking monetary separation. This enables IC to be developed within the context of
existing monetary unit arrangements, and this is now the common practice. [See, for example,
Dowd (1995) and Schnadt and Whittaker (1993).]For a contemporary treatment of IC that uses
monetary separation, see Selgin and White (1994).
3    This is defining rule in the sense of a pre-commitment to future action and, in this context,
there is a commitment to aim for the target [Rowe (1989).
4with attaining the target. The action to be taken, however, unlike IC, is left to the
discretion of the committing institutions (in this case, central banks). That is,
discretion, and not an operational (or instrument) rule, determines what is done
to meet the target.
There are other, but not significant, differences between IC and IT.
Neither, for example, adopts the same criteria for choosing the components of
the basket of goods whose monetary value is to be stabilized.  Similarly, IC
prefers scaling the quantities within the basket to have the nominal (and market)
price of the basket equal one monetary unit on the date IC is to take effect.5 IT,
on the other hand, is typically developed in the context of stabilizing a price
index.  In addition, the frequency at which prices are reported thereafter, and
hence when intervention may be called for, differs across the two approaches,
with IC proposing continuous pricing and IT based on periodic pricing.  Finally, IC
is advanced for the institutional setting of free banking while IT is currently
analyzed only in relation to central banking. All these differences, however, are
subsidiary to the fundamental difference arising from IC using an operational rule
while IT does not.
The similarity in focus on maintaining purchasing power between the
current practice of IT and the recent proposal for IC naturally suggests asking
whether the IC operationa] rule necessary for its successful operation could be
                                                                                                                                                
4   The literature on inflation targeting is now voluminous.  Important current articles that describe
differing practices across countries include the papers in Bernanke et al (1998), Leidermand and
Svensson (1995) and Lowe (1997).
5    This is only implied in the IC literature. It means letting “bygones be bygones” at the start up,
which is exactly what happens on the start up of IT. That is, there is no attempt to make a
monetary correction first in order to move the current price level, on start up, to some other level
before commencing either IC or IT.
5made into a practical rule that inflation targeting central banks could adopt in lieu
of discretion.  Our affirmative answer can be easily represented by first
expressing the IC rule more formally than usual so that our subsequent analysis
of the applicability of the rule for IT can be based on this more general theoretic
foundation.
  II. The IC Operating Rule
To be used for IT purposes, the IC rule has to be formally extracted from
the literal statement in which it is usually embodied.  That statement requires the
institutions implementing IC (originally developed for the institutional setting of
free banking) to commit to making the monetary unit convertible (redeemable)
into a single tradable item termed the medium of redemption (henceforth, MOR)
at an exchange ratio equal to the current value of the basket.6  At the current
market price of the MOR, this means a commitment to exchange enough units of
the MOR for each monetary unit to provide a monetary value equal to the current
price of the basket.  In this indirect way, then, the monetary unit can be said to
have a value equivalent to one basket.
Those who undertake IC must honour the commitment by paying out the
requisite number of MOR units, a number that will vary with the basket price.  In
the original IC proposal, the commitment was to be made by each bank in a free
banking system, but it is not much of an extension to see that this commitment
could also be made by a central bank.  (For the time being, however, the analysis
will replicate IC in the context of its designated free banking institutional setting.)
6Just how much of the MOR must be paid out in any given period can be
specified more formally from the general statement of the IC condition. To this
end, the commodity “gold” will be used as the MOR and the term “dollar” taken to
represent the monetary unit.  At the time when IC is launched, then, there will be
a dollar price for gold, pg, and a dollar price for the basket to be stabilized, pb.  To
keep in line with the IC literature, we scale the quantities in the basket such that
the average price of all its components at prevailing market prices work out to $1.
Through time pb is calculated from the market prices of its components and so
may vary away from its initial value of $1.  The MOR price, pg, is the current
market price of gold.
The IC commitment requires banks to pay out enough units of gold, U, per
dollar to create a dollar value of gold equal to the current basket price, pb.  (The
two-way nature of this commitment, which can also be expressed as paying out
dollars for gold, is ignored for simplicity of expression.)  This way of expressing
the rule for meeting the IC commitment makes U the independent variable or the
variable subject to change by bank action.
When IC is originally adopted, pb is set at $1 and a dollar is the exchange
equivalent to a basket.  The condition mandated by IC is fully met.  It follows that
there is nothing that banks need do under IC nor will IC impose any additional
requirement on the banking system as long as pb remains equal to $1.   Action is
required only when the latest basket price calculated departs from $1.  Suppose
then that there arises a time, t = 1, when the latest basket price is calculated and
                                                                                                                                                
6   Even under strict monetary separation, in which the basket price is usually not thought
variable, variations in the basket price are sometimes allowed (Yeager and Greenfield (1989),
7publicly revealed to be greater than $1, denoted as 1bp  > $1.  Suppose also that at
that same point in time the gold price is observed to be 1gp .   Maintenance of the
IC rule means that the banks now need to determine the required quantity of U to
pay out.
Because the quantity of U can be determined only after 1bp  > $1 has been
announced and the current market price of the MOR, 1gp , has been observed, the
required quantity of U set by the banks can be set only for the next period of
time, t = 2.  We designate this required quantity as U2.  For purposes of analysis,
the length of the time interval between t=1 and t=2 may be nearly non-existent
(as in the original version of IC where pricing is continuous) or as long as the
conventionally accepted interval for recalculating the basket price (such as a
month).  What is important is the sequencing of the price observation before the
quantity is set and, whatever the time interval used, the quantity arrived at in the
U2 solution must hold until the next basket price is calculated.
Given 1bp  and
1
gp , the rule for determining U2 is simply U2 = 
1
bp /
1
gp . This is
because the rule must meet the IC condition that the number of units of gold per
dollar paid out valued at their current price must equal the current price of the
basket, that is, U2 x 
1
gp  must equal 
1
bp .   U2 is then found by cross multiplication.
This way of expressing IC is, of course, a unit setting rule for the next
period and while this is an obvious way to express banks’ obligations under IC, it
is a less useful way of expressing the rule for comparison with inflation targeting.
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8Here a price setting rule is more helpful since in the pursuit of price stability
under inflation targeting, the variable that is typically subject to change is a price
rather than a unit quantity.  Fortunately, the IC unit setting rule converts easily
into a price setting one.
To see this, note that the determination of the number of units of gold per
dollar, U2, will also determine its inverse, the number of dollars exchanged per
unit of gold.  This is the gold price in t=2, i.e. 2gp  where 
2
gp  º 1/ U2.  Substituting
in the unit setting rule solved for above, we can see that 2gp  = 1/ U2 = 
1
gp /
1
bp .  It
then follows that whenever 1bp  is calculated and announced as different from $1,
banks can use the observed gold price 1gp  to set a new exchange price for gold in
t=2.  Expressing its obligations in terms of meeting this new price will satisfy the
IC obligation so that using a price setting rule instead of a unit setting rule does
not affect the ability to meet the IC commitment.
From the price setting rule it can be seen that whenever 1bp  > 1,
2
gp < 
1
gp ,
and vice versa. This property enters the next, and most useful, formulation of the
IC rule.  Here our focus is on deriving an IC formula for determining how much
the MOR price must be altered for any observed change in the targeted basket
price.  This is our preferred form of the IC rule because it allows the target to be
transformed easily from a basket price of $1 to more general representations of
price stability such the constancy of a price index or a low inflation rate.  Such a
reformulation facilitates the comparison of the IC rule to inflation targeting, since
the latter relies exclusively on either an index number or inflation rate target.
9What is solved for under the price change formulation of the IC rule is the
expression ( 2gp  –
1
gp )/
1
gp  – the required percentage by which
1
gp  must be altered
given the observed percentage change in the basket price. This can be solved
for in the following steps:
(1) 1gp  x U2 = 
1
bp , from the IC commitment.
(2) 2gp   x U2  = 1, from the relationship between unit price, and units per dollar.
(3) U2 (
1
gp  – 
2
gp ) = 
1
bp  – 1, by subtracting (2) from (1).
(4) ( 1gp  – 
2
gp ) /
1
gp  x U2 = (
1
bp  – 1)/ 
1
gp , by dividing both sides of (3) by 
1
gp .
(5) ( 1gp  –
2
gp )/
1
gp  = (
1
bp  – 1)/ 1 x 1/(
1
gp  x U2) = (
1
bp   – 1)]/1 x 1/
1
bp , by dividing both
sides of (4) by U2 and substituting from (1).
The left-hand side of (5) is the desired percentage change in the gold price when
the basket price moves above 1 by the percentage shown in the right hand side
of the equation, namely, ( 1bp   – 1)/ 1.  Since
1
gp  >
2
gp , the signs of the percentage
changes are opposites.  It should also be noted that the required gold price
change is always related to the deviation in the basket price from 1. This confers
on the $1 basket price the nature of a price objective. Therefore, it does not
matter what the previous basket price was prior to 1bp   – it could have been 1 or
something else – the basket price deviation is always calculated from 1. The gold
price that is subject to change by the banks is always the price associated with
U2.  Of course, if 1bp  is already at 1, or has recently fallen (risen) to 1 from a
higher (lower) level, banks following IC need make no change in the prevailing
gold price.  
10
As 1/ 1bp  in (5) is typically very close to1 when 
1
bp  ¹ 1, little is lost if this factor
is ignored for purposes of simplifying the IC percentage change rule.7  Further,
this approximation allows the expression of required change to be symmetric in
both directions about the basket price of 1.  With this adjustment, then, the IC
price setting rule can be stated simply as requiring the percentage change in the
current gold price to be equal but opposite in sign to the percentage deviation of
the current basket price from 1. This will be the form of the IC rule adopted for
further analysis.
III. The Working of the IC Rule
It is generally accepted that whatever the form of the IC rule followed, the
rule works only through its monetary effects on prices (Dowd, 1996, 299).
Through these effects, the rule serves to restore the basket price to $1 whenever
the basket price moves away from its target value of $1. It should be noted that
the rule calls only for the behavior, or reaction, necessary to induce the required
monetary effects. IC itself is not dependent on how that reaction is described.  A
simple description for a gold-type MOR, when banks follow the IC rule to reduce
the market price of gold, is to consider them as creating more eager buyers for
gold and so initiating a kind of open-market operation in the gold market. The
outcome of banks selling more gold for medium of exchange is a general
tightening of monetary conditions and a resultant downward pressure on the
                                                
7   The form given below would be fully correct if the percentage changes where calculated using
an average of initial and ending prices.  That is, the discrepancy appears because the same
absolute change forms a higher percentage when the change is in a downward rather than an
upward direction.
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basket price. This need not rule out other competing descriptions for how
monetary conditions are tightened.8
In short, IC stabilizes purchasing power only by inducing changes in
monetary conditions.  In this general sense, then, IC works on the same principle
as discretionary monetary policy.  That is, both rely on a deliberate change in a
policy variable to alter monetary conditions in a way that achieves some larger
price or stabilization objective.  In this vein, our discussion of IC can be
interpreted also as a rule for pursuing a zero inflation target.9
Realizing that IC works through the effects of monetary changes on prices
means that the IC rule need not be tied to any particular price measure or to any
particular rate of change. In other words it can work for any number of stability
standards, including those expressed as index numbers or inflation rates.  When
the actual measure is off target, whether that be a set point or a range of
acceptable values, the MOR variable is changed by the extent called for by the
rule and in the direction required for producing the desired monetary effects on
prices.  As long as the rule can generate the monetary effects on which the
effectiveness of the rule depends, it is immaterial whether the target is a fixed
                                                
8  Thus the IC literature sees the transmission, process in terms of arbitrage affecting the money
supply in a price stabilizing direction, as the gap between the MOR price set by banks and by the
market is eliminated. Furthermore, if interest rate changes play a major role in the adjustment to
the accompanying monetary effects, the reaction process can be described entirely in terms of
those interest rate changes, as is now the preferred central bank description for the monetary
transmission process. [See The Bank of England, 1999]).
9   Of course, a constant price level target does not tolerate “by gones” as an inflation target does.
This, however, reflects only a difference in attitude as to what constitutes acceptable price
stability. It does not affect the operational approach, so that both IC and IT can work with
whatever measure of price stability is adopted.
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price level – as in the original IC version – or an inflation rate – as in inflation
targeting.10
 Being dependent as it is on monetary effects, IC has to face the general
problem of lags between changes in monetary conditions and their effects on
prices.  Inflation-targeting central banks deal with this problem by basing their
price stabilizing operations on a forecast of inflation far enough into the future to
allow for the lag.  In other words, it is the deviation of the inflation forecast from
the target, not current inflation from the target, that triggers the move in the
control or policy variable. The IC rule could deal with monetary lags in exactly the
same way by substituting a forecast of inflation for its current measure.11  For the
IC rule to have its desired effect on future prices, monetary conditions must be
altered in the appropriate direction.  And to bring about that desired direction,
monetary effects need not be based on continuous or periodic current pricing.
Replacing the current price by the forecast price in the price-change rule for IC
would allow for monetary lags while still observing the intent of IC.12
                                                
10     The specification of the target, however, does affect the magnitude of the response called for
because an inflation rate is expressed as an annualized value, much like an interest rate. This is
a different kind of number than a simple percentage deviation in an MOR price. Thus, a 1 per
cent price rise in a month translates roughly into a 12 per cent inflation rate. So how much the
MOR price should be altered in this case depends very much on the target specification. How
allowance can be made for this is covered, implicitly, in the text forthcoming.
11 To preserve the transparency and credibility of the original IC proposal, the forecast should be
made by an institution other than the one charged with the responsibility for implementing the IC
forecast rule. This is directly analogous to the case under the traditional IC rule that the current
price level must be calculated and announced by an agency other than the one charged with
maintaining the constancy of the price level. Also, the forecast should be based on the current
setting for the MOR, on the assumption of no change being made in the MOR setting.
12   The recognition of the lag of monetary effects on money prices implied in the use of the
forecast price allows IC to escape what has often been called “the Wicksell paradox”, especially
when the MOR is not part of the basket This problem, also known as the “paradox of IC” [Dowd,
1996] can arise when the IC rule is activated by current prices and yet can produce effects only
on future prices.  By tying the rule to prices that can be influenced by the rule, the short run
complications associated with having the MOR price fall to zero and/or running out of MOR
reserves disappear. Another problem that disappears with the use of forward-looking basket
13
The effectiveness of IC also depends on inducing the right degree of
change in monetary conditions when the price objective is not being met. To this
end, the right degree might not result from a simple one-for-one change in the
MOR price for any given deviation of the actual from target, as specified in the
basic IC formulation. It may well be that some coefficient other than 1 when
applied to the percentage deviation from the price objective would produce a
more appropriate change in monetary conditions.  In the absence of having more
specific information, and having the advantage of establishing a clear and
precise commitment statement, a coefficient of one might well be the best that
can be done.13
Recent econometric work on monetary policy rules, however, suggests
that a better outcome might be achieved. That is, econometric work could be
directed at determining what coefficient would generate a more effective IC rule.
Such an empirically determined coefficient could have a value of 1, but could
also have a value higher or lower than 1 and could differ across countries under
different circumstances.  To be useable for IC purposes, the coefficient need only
be pre-determined and committed to publicly, provided by a source external to
the committing institutions, and considered generally acceptable to the
community at large.
                                                                                                                                                
pricing is disruption for the MOR market, which can occur under periodic basket pricing using
continuously-available current prices for the basket contents.
13  This is essentially the same reason given by Fisher (1920) for choosing the one-to-one
percentage change rule and adopting frequent price revaluation as a way of keeping this ad hoc
adjustment rule on target.  Dowd (1996), however, argues that an inappropriate fixed adjustment
coefficient of one might well introduce instability to the adjustment process of prices through time.
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To adopt an empirical, as opposed to a conceptual, coefficient means only
a minor restating of the formal price-change IC rule.  That is, the IC rule now
states that the percentage change in the MOR price must be in a direction
opposite to the deviation of the basket price from its pre-committed target by an
amount equal to the percentage deviation from the target times the publicly
provided coefficient.  Any value other than one does not alter the nature of the
rule – it only improves its effectiveness and allows the rule to become economy-
specific.
In short, IC works through monetary conditions being changed as a result
of following a precise rule to hit a price/inflation target.  As such, it must use
expected rather than current prices in order to allow for the lags between a
change in conditions and their ultimate effect on prices.  For even greater
effectiveness, the rule could also draw upon publicly available information to
provide a coefficient for determining the optimum MOR price change for the
desired price effect.
 IV. Applying IC to Central Banking
Because the IC rule can be generalized in the foregoing manner, the
generalized IC rule offers a ready-made monetary policy rule for present day,
inflation-targeting central banks.  Currently, these banks use discretion to vary an
administered interest rate (their policy variable) in order to change monetary
conditions (an intermediate target) to correct the deviation between their forecast
for the rate of inflation and an pre-announced inflation target.  (In some cases the
deviation is from a single valued target; in other cases it is the distance from the
15
outer bound of an inflation range. In all cases, however, the target is compared to
a forward-looking rather than current rate of inflation.) Following an IC rule would
accomplish the same thing automatically.
For a central bank currently operating through short-term internal interest
rates to adapt an equivalent IC rule, the central bank could continue to use the
same non-market financial instrument as its “MOR”.  Doing so would cause no
inherent problem since there is nothing to prevent the IC rule from being
expressed in terms of a non-market interest rate (rather than a price).  In the
context of free banking, the MOR rate could be thought of as a short-term bank
loan rate; in the proposed case of central banking the MOR rate would be the
current short-term central bank rate.14  The only difference made by the use of
interest rates rather than security prices is that the rate must now be moved in
the same direction as the deviation of the expected basket price from target.
Higher interest rates become the counterpart to the lower security prices for
correcting unwanted higher prices. Otherwise, varying an interest rate to induce
price stabilizing monetary effects is no different, in principle, from varying a
commodity-type price for the same purpose.
There is an important operating difference that arises, however, because
non-market or administered interest rates do not self-adjust for changes in
inflationary expectations, as do market-clearing rates.   Therefore a change in
inflationary expectations – say an increase – will mean a reduction in the real
                                                
14  Coats (1989) and Walters (1990) make the case for using a financial security as an MOR.
Their analyses use the price of the security rather than its interest rate or yield as the policy
instrument, but the two dimensions are equivalent ways of representing the same policy
instrument.
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value of an unaltered administratively set rate.  This fall in real value of a set
nominal rate represents an easing of monetary conditions at a time when either
neutrality or tightening is called for (should the forecast price be above target).
To counteract this unintended effect, then, the MOR rate has to be restored to its
former real value.  Then this restored, or inflation-adjusted, nominal interest rate
now becomes subject to the IC rule.  Once that adjusted rate has neutralized the
expected change in inflationary expectations the coefficient in the rule can then
have its value determined econometrically (and may be less than one).  The
alternative is to use the previously set nominal rate and apply a coefficient that
causes the set rate to change by more than the inflationary change.  In the
context of the current monetary policy rules literature this is known as imposing a
Taylor property on the interest rate rule.
A final modification that can be made for an IC rule that uses as its MOR
an administered interest rate is in the terms of the units in which the interest rate
change is expressed. This is the outcome of using inflation rates (rates of change
in prices) in place of price levels.   Because the absolute difference between the
levels of interest rates and inflation rates is typically small, it is convenient and
becoming conventional to express the expected inflation rate and the inflation
target rate in terms of basis points, such as 200 and 300, in lieu of 2% and 3%.
The difference between the two sets of basis points – here 100 basis points – is
then used to calculate by how many basis points the inflation adjusted MOR rate
should be altered.  That will be less than 100 basis points in the case shown if
the adjustment coefficient in the rule has been established at less than 1.
17
These modest modifications then allow a self-administered interest rate to
serve as proxy MOR and in this form the IC rule becomes suitable for use by
present day inflation targeting central banks.
V. Central Bank Operations under IC
To operate under an IC rule, as now presented here, a central bank
practicing inflation targeting faces only minor adjustments in current practice.
Because the IC rule works best when the forward-looking view in use has a
definite end, the biggest change might be thought to be the adoption of a fixed
inflation horizon.  Perhaps surprisingly, however, many of the IT central banks
have already adopted this practice (see Siklos, 1999).  Similarly, under IC, price
forecasts should be publicly disclosed and even without IC being practiced, some
central banks already reveal their forecasts.  In this sense, IC proposes no
additional constraint on current IT practices. It merely converts some
discretionary practices, such as the use of a fixed inflation horizon, into a firm
commitment.
There would, of course, be a loss of discretion.  Both the timing and the
extent of any interest rate change needed to hit the inflation target, at a fixed
horizon, would now be determined automatically by the IC rule. In following the
rule there would be no fine-tuning.  For example, if it were thought that the cost of
over forecasting inflation were greater than under forecasting it, discretion likely
would select a more modest change in interest rates than would the rule. This
need not be a major problem under IC if the forecasts are not consistently biased
and the lag in recognizing whether a rule-based change was excessive was
18
short.  In that case, more frequent forecasting would catch actions that initiated
either over- or under-shooting.15
Aside from the fine-tuning constraint, IC imposes no other restrictions on
central bank IT behavior.  Thus, as it does now, an inflation-targeting central
bank may still move its interest rate instrument for technical reasons unrelated to
inflation targeting.  At present when other market interest rates move in response
to forces not closely connected with the outlook for inflation and a central bank
adjusts its policy rate to stay in line with the market, that central bank is said to
be “following the market”.  The move can also be described as adjusting the real
value of the policy rate to keep it in a neutral policy stance.  This kind of neutral
adjustment is also called for under the IC rule – the IC control rate has to be kept
at a real level sufficient to avoid inducing monetary effects when none are
required. The IC rule then works off this level, and the information and knowledge
required to set the proper rate under the IC rule are no different from what a
discretionary central bank would have to have.  Even under an IC rule, then, the
practice of following the market would still need to be observed.
The same degree of freedom as IT central banks now have to consider
objectives other than inflation targeting would also exist under the IC rule.  When
the price objective is being met, the MOR pricing rule can be interpreted to mean
more than just keeping the MOR price unchanged.  That is, when the basket
price equals $1, there is no requirement under IC to change the existing MOR
price.  However, the MOR price could be changed if such a change did not lead
                                                
15  On the other hand, if there was a true asymmetry in adjustment costs, the IC rule could be
adapted to cover that case.  The coefficient for upward adjustment would be different than for
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the basket price to depart from $1.  There would then be no need for the central
bank to have to reset the MOR price.16  In other words, there can be a range of
MOR prices for a given state of the economy that are not in conflict with meeting
the overall price objective.17
This possibility would leave banks under IC, and so a central bank, free to
move the MOR or policy variable, as desired, when the inflation target was being
met and the move did not cause inflation to depart from the target. In this case,
with the target being met and not being affected by an unrelated interest move, a
central bank can give consideration to addressing other macro economic
objectives through a rate movement not related to inflation targeting.18
Nor, given the nature of the IC rule, should rigidity prove a major obstacle.
Given the establishment of a well-chosen policy instrument (the MOR in IC
terminology), and agreement on all aspects of the inflation target, the only rigid
element in the IC rule would be the coefficient of adjustment for calculating the
amount by which to change the policy variable.  Since this coefficient can be
empirically determined, that is determined by our best structural knowledge of the
operation of the economy, its level could be made the subject of public enquiry and
agreement, just as the inflation objective is, and so altered as structural conditions
dictate.  This would provide for the same flexibility as now exists under an IT
discretionary approach, in which a central bank needs to take any structural shift in
                                                                                                                                                
downward adjustment.
16  This is more likely to be the case if the MOR is not one of the items in the basket.
17  Patinkin (1996) sees Fisher’s proposal (1920) as differing from IC in fixing the price of the
MOR at all points in time.
18   This is in accordance with a widely held belief that even under a firm and explicit commitment
to inflation targeting a central bank can pursue other objectives.  See Bernanke et al. (1999).
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the economy into account. A coefficient that was subject to change only over a
period of time would not be in violation of the spirit of an empirically based IC rule. 
Introducing empirical content into an IC type operational rule, however, does
not make the rule the same as a current monetary policy rule like any now cropping
up in econometric studies of monetary policy That is, while the determination of an
IC-like adjustment coefficient could be arrived at solely on the basis of the
econometric work, the current empirical approach, aimed at discovering or
formulating what a central bank does, is not based on the same forward-looking
information set that would become available under IC. If the econometric work
could, or did, the result might suggest adoption of an IC type operational rule,
without any reference to IC itself. Thus, although a knowledge of IC may not be
absolutely necessary to formulating the rule it contains, knowing the IC background
can prove useful for providing the framework, and guidance, for arriving at a purely
econometrically inspired operational (or instrument) rule for an IT central bank.
In any case, however arrived at, under the appropriate conditions, a central
bank practicing IT could operate by an IC rule. To do so would mean adding a
further constraint, to that already imposed by IT, on the use of discretion. Therefore,
the issue raised by suggesting an operational rule for IT central bank becomes a
question of how much discretion should be given up. The answer lies in assessing
whether the supposed gains from the loss of discretion caused by adopting IT can
be further enlarged by giving up more discretion for an operational rule to
supplement IT.
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VI. Conclusions
From the interpretation of indirect convertibility [IC] developed in this paper,
IC can be seen as a ready-made monetary policy rule suitable for adoption by a
central bank practicing inflation targeting [IT]. Examination of the properties of such
a rule can both enlighten and guide not only the on-going discussions of inflation
targeting but also the newly developed interest by econometricians in monetary
policy rules.
The connection between IC, on the one hand, and inflation targeting, on
the other, becomes clear with the realization that IC, despite being obscurely
defined and narrowly specified, only works through having the same kind of
monetary effects on prices as inflation targeting requires. At a more general level,
there is a connection through the focus of both being the preservation of
purchasing power.
Extracting the IC rule from its basic statement, which in accordance with
the statement will generate monetary effects, has shown how the rule can be
specified in terms or variables acceptable for a central bank.  In particular, the
rule can use the preferred policy variable of the central bank, usually an
endogenous short-term interest rate. In addition, the rule fits any well-specified
and quantified measure of price stability, including inflation rates, established
either as a point or a range. This allows for the use of inflation forecasts in the
rule to match the current forward-looking approach of central banks to inflation
targeting.
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Following an IC rule for inflation targeting by a central bank means that the
bank’s interest rate will change automatically every time the inflation forecast
departs from the target at some pre-selected point in the future.  A central bank
with a given horizon for meeting its explicit inflation target already operates in the
same way. It moves an interest rate to hit a target, although it may use some
discretion in timing the move and determining the extent. This discretion is lost in
accepting the rule but so is the political debate over moves based on discretion
rather than on a rule. No other loss of discretion occurs by adopting the rule.
Of interest for the econometric work on monetary policy rules is the use
the IC rule can put that work to for making the rule specific for a particular
economy. In return, a purely empirically based proposal for an operational rule
suited for IT central bank would benefit from awareness of IC. In particular, IC
draws attention to the conditions and specifications for a properly constructed
rule – something that might not be so readily apparent from empirical research
alone.
In short, it might be concluded that the explicit and outright acceptance by
central banks of inflation targeting is, albeit unintended, a move away from
unrestrained discretion in monetary policy in return for considerations, such as
improved credibility, accountability, and transparency. It is now time to ask
whether by accepting a further containment in discretion by embracing IC might
add to the foregoing consideration.
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